Studies of farm family off-farm labor supply decisions have appeared frequently in the literature. Theoretical models based on the assumption of utility maximization have focused on the family's time allocation, i.e., Huffman (1980) . Empirical applications typically have focused on a single family member, ignoring possible implications of joint decisions. Mroz and Thompson have shown that results from empirical models of married women's labor supply decisions are sensitive to model specification; however, neither Mroz nor Thompson explicitly considered the importance of joint decisions. Joint decision making is of greater importance to the farm family when both husband and wife allocate their time among farm work, off-farm work, home production, and leisure. Recently, empirical models have been extended to joint estimation of farm operator/spouse or male/female participation and supply decisions (Huffman and Lange; Gould and Saupe; Tokle and Huffman) . Huffman and Lange demonstrated the importance of modeling household decisions jointly, concluding that off-farm labor supply functions vary significantly in structure depending upon the spouses' decisions.
Theoretical results from utility models of time allocation show that expected signs for many parameters are ambiguous. For example, the impact of off-farm wage on labor supply may be negative or positive. The pure substitution effect of an increase in off-farm wage results in an increase in off-farm hours worked and decrease in leisure. The income effect is a priori uncertain. If leisure is a normal good, the income effect from an increase in off-farm wage has the opposite effect of, and may outweigh, the substitution effect. In addition, an increase in off-farm wage would lead to a decrease in onfarm hours, assuming no externalities.' Expected effects of human capital on participation and supply decisions of farm households are also ambiguous. Additions to the stock of education, for example, may improve efficiency of farm labor, thereby increasing the shadow value of on-farm time. However, increases in education also lead to higher off-farm wages. The relative strengths of these two effects on participation and supply decisions are unknown and are left as empirical questions.
Objectives of this paper are to embody important features of theoretical models of off-farm labor supply in an empirical model for the farm family. The first important feature is the application of methods appropriate for joint farm family labor supply decisions. Given Huffman 
Model Specification
Farm households are assumed to maximize utility (Huffman 1980) (1) U = U(O, LI, L2; H, E) subject to constraints (2) PoO = PqQ -RS + WiMI + W2M2 + V (3) Q = f(S, F,, F2; H, G)
T, = L, + F, + Yl; and Yl -0, for 1 = 1, 2. Leisure of only two household members, the operator (1 = 1) and spouse (1 = 2), are considered. The household chooses levels of purchased goods (0), leisure (L, and L2), farm labor (F, and F2), off-farm labor (Y, and Y2), and farm inputs (S). Assumed fixed are stocks of human capital (H), prices for other goods (Po), farm output price (Pq), farm input prices (R), off-farm wages (Wl, W2), other income (V), and other exogenous factors (F and G) that shift the utility function and production function, respectively.
Both operator and spouse are assumed to have opportunities of supplying on-farm labor (FI and F2) and off-farm labor (Y, and Y2). The typical budget constraint (2) is imposed on the household, with farm profits and off-farm wages contributing to household income. This problem is similar to Shishko and Rostker's analysis of multiple job holding. An important difference arises in the constraint imposed by the production function (3); given normal regularity conditions, operator and spouse's on-farm labor will face diminishing marginal returns. Finally, constraints (4) say that leisure, on-farm labor, and off-farm labor compete for total time available.
An interior solution exists if optimal allocations of time to leisure, on-farm, and off-farm work are all nonzero. Optimal levels of choice variables then can be determined by solving first order conditions (see Huffman 1980) . However, corner solutions may exist for operator and spouse's off-farm work. If corner solutions exist, off-farm labor supply functions are determined by simultaneously solving Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Huffman and Lange discuss in detail the conditional nature of farm family decisions.
Off-farm supply decisions are assumed to be made jointly by the farm family. The resulting off-farm labor supply function for the operator (spouse) is conditional upon the participation decision of the spouse (operator). Our model results in four off-farm work regimes: (1) both operator and spouse work (Y1 > 0, Y2 > 0); (2) only the operator works (Y1 > 0, Y2 = 0); (3) only the spouse works (Y1 = 0, Y2 > 0); and (4) neither operator nor spouse work offfarm (Y1 = 0, Y2 = 0). The reduced form of the operator's off-farm supply function when the spouse also works off-farm is
where the superscript denotes off-farm work regime. In this regime, operator's supply depends upon spouse's wage. Operator supply does not depend upon spouse's wage when the spouse does not work off-farm:
The spouse's supply function is defined similarly when both work (regime 1) and when only the spouse works (regime 3).
Empirical Model
The empirical model of farm family off-farm work includes supply functions for operator (Y,) and spouse (Y2), and two participation decision rules. Unobserved indicators (I*) are assumed to represent differences between individuals' value (WI) of off-farm time and on-farm time at zero hours of off-farm work. If the potential market wage of an individual's off-farm time is greater than the shadow value of on-farm time, a positive number of off-farm hours will be observed. Thus participation decision rules determine observed values for YI: Heckman's two-stage procedure to account for multiple selection rules can be applied to obtain consistent estimates of supply functions for different off-farm work regimes (see Maddala, .
There are two sources of sample selection in the model: the operator works or does not and the spouse works or does not. While these two where Y is a (n x 1) vector, x is a (n x K) matrix of the stacked x4, D is a (n x nK) diagonal matrix of the x4, e is a (nK x 1) vector of eis, and u is a (n x 1) vector. Disturbances u, and Eik are assumed to have zero means. It is also assumed that E(u; Eik) = 0 for all i and k, E(u2) = o , E(ui uj) = 0 for i # j, E(e ej) = A for i = j, and E(ei ej) = 0 for i # j. Given 
Estimation of (14) using (16) requires that (17) and (15) be known. The SWAMSLEY Fortran based algorithm (Swamy and Tinsley) provides a minimum average risk linear estimator, which can be shown to be more efficient than the generalized least squares estimator for given values of p and A (Havenner and Swamy) . Since A is unknown, the SWAMSLEY algorithm allows for initial data-based selection of A, with either zero or nonzero off-diagonal elements. After several iterations, stable values of P and A are obtained. [it, lli 112i * Supply functions in (11.1)-(11.4) will be estimated by Heckman's two-stage procedure and as two-stage RCMs. For regime 1, operator and spouse supply functions will be estimated jointly to allow for cross-equation correlation of errors.
(Singh and Ullah extend RCM to the seemingly unrelated case.) Supply functions for the operator when the spouse does not work (regime 2) and for the spouse when the operator does not work (regime 3) are estimated separately. Individual RCM parameters will be estimated and distributions of values considered. Of particular interest are individual labor supply responses to changes in off-farm wage rates. Wage rates are assumed to represent exogenous evaluation of individuals' human capital stock. Wage functions often are modeled and used in supply functions as predicted endogenous variables (Huffman and Lange, Sumner) . But this eliminates important variation. In this study, actual wages were used to estimate supply functions. Wages are only arguments of supply functions. Theoretically, the difference between off-farm wage and shadow value of farm labor determines the dependent variable in participation models. Hours supplied off-farm typically have been found to have a positive relationship to off-farm wages (see Hallberg, Findeis, and Lass for reviews).
Individual characteristics include age, education, off-farm experience, and years farming.
Age was measured in years, as were education (high school graduate = 12 years), off-farm experience, and farm experience. Including age in quadratic form allows estimation of life cycle effects. Where life-cycle effects are observed, participation and hours supplied typically peak between ages 45 and 55. However, evidence of life cycle effects is conflicting (e.g., Rosenfeld). Off-farm experience was measured by the number of years the individual had off-farm work, including current job and previous jobs. Off-farm experience data were available only for individuals who worked off-farm. Previous empirical evidence has found farm experience to be negatively related to participation probability. Education and off-farm experience generally have positive effects on participation and supply.
Number of children in the family less than five years of age and those children aged five to eighteen were included to indicate number of dependents, a factor which has been found to be an important explanatory variable for farm women in off-farm participation and supply functions (Rosenfeld; Thompson; Tokle and Huffman) . Since most spouses in this study are female, it is anticipated that number of children is more important to the spouse's decision. Also included in the data set was a measure of other income (non-wage income) available to the family. Other income was measured as a percentage of total family income. If leisure is a normal good, higher levels of other income would result in fewer hours of off-farm employment.
Previous empirical results generally support this hypothesis although estimates have been inelastic (Sumner, Thompson) .
Categorical and binary variables were included as farm characteristics. Ideally, the quasirent or production function would be estimated,
with predicted values included in participation and supply models (Huffman 1980, Streeter and Saupe) ; however, necessary survey data were not available. A single categorical variable for farm sales, ranging from one (<$10,000) to five (>$500,000), was used as an alternative. We expect lower participation and fewer hours supplied for operators of larger farms. Binary variables for farm type were also included, using livestock (beef, hogs, and sheep) as basis for comparison. Participation and supply depend upon time requirements for different farm types.
Dairy farm operators, for example, would be expected to have lower participation rates and fewer hours supplied.
Several variables were used to capture location relative to centers of population or employment. Distance to nearest town was used in participation models to capture access to employment possibilities. Individuals who worked off-farm were asked how far they drive one way to work.
Actual commuting distance to current job was used to measure location relative to employment centers for off-farm workers. Commuting distance also indicates costs associated with participation and labor supply. Cogan has shown that effects of such costs are ambiguous. income. In addition operator working o than the mean. Res pothesis: maximum farm work occur teristics were imp significant effect and education. Es to spouse's age may be related to cycle. Minimum probability for th at spouse's age 53, just after spous probability of off-farm employmen education on operator's participation to be positive, albeit insignificant. S of education had a significant positiv operator's probability of working off is consistent with Sumner's findi levels of farm and family financial duced the probability of operator's w farm. Both higher farm sales and gr of nonwage income lessen the likel erator's off-farm work.
Farm spouse responses correlated strongly to family characteristics. Significant negative effects on spouse's participation were found for households with children less than five years of age as well as for children between 5 and 18. Increased farm sales also reduced spouse's participation. Higher levels of spouse's education significantly increased participation. It is notable that operator characteristics had no effect on spouse participation decisions. If the farm sales variable captures the farm's viability, then spouse's participation depends primarily on farm operation success and the presence of children.
Several variables carried expected signs but were insignificant. Parameter estimates for the spouse support the life cycle hypothesis, with the maximum participation probability occurring at age 36; however, results were not statistically significant. Other income had a negative effect on the spouse as well as the operator, suggesting leisure (or home time) is a normal good.
Finally, the greater the distance to the nearest town, the lower were probabilities of off-farm employment.
Supply Functions
To correct for sample selection bias, both fixed coefficient and RCM supply functions were estimated by two-stage methods. (Swamy 1971) , the null hypothesis, Ho: A = 0, was rejected at the 1% level for each regime. Calculated chi-square statistics were 323.62 for the joint model of the first regime, 118.36 for the second regime, and 102.65 for the third regime. Parameters for all regime supply functions appear to be random. The following discussion will focus on interpretation of RCM mean parameters. Mean parameter estimates for RCMs were generally consistent in sign and more efficient than fixed coefficient estimates .7
Consistent with Huffman and Lange's findings, structures of individual supply functions changed depending upon spouse's participation.
Off-farm wages had limited importance in supply decisions of both operators and spouses. Ownwage effects on operator hours supplied were negative for both regimes, but estimated parameters were not significantly different from zero. When both operator and spouse worked off-farm, spouse's own-wage effect was positive, although insignificant. When only the spouse worked off-farm, own-wage effect was negative and significant. Operator supply response to spouse's wage was negative also, suggesting spouse off-farm labor is a substitute for the operator's. Opposite cross-wage effect was observed for the spouse, suggesting that operator off-farm supply complements spouse's off-farm supply. However, neither cross-wage effect was significantly different from zero.
Individual characteristics had significant effects on supply functions. Own-age effect for the operator was inversely related to number of hours supplied when the spouse did not work off-farm. When both operator and spouse worked off-farm, age of spouse also was inversely re-6 Calculated t-statistics presented are conditional on the estimated selectivity terms included.
7 Havenner and Swamy discuss the relative efficiency of the RCM estimators. lated to supply. A significant pos effect was found for the spouse erator did not work. Operator's o had significant impacts on supply gimes. With higher own-educatio hours declined when both work and increased when only the operator worked off-farm. A spouse's additional education of one year resulted in a reduction in supply by over 400 hours when the operator did not work. The number of off-farm employment years had consistently positive impacts on both operator and spouse supply functions. Own-experience effects were statistically significant in all models.
Effects of operator (spouse) characteristics on spouse's (operator's) supply decisions indicate changing structures of supply functions. When the operator or spouse did not work off-farm, their wage, off-farm experience, and commuting distance were not arguments of the supply Effects of children demonstrate important nually on spouse's supply. However, preschool children represented a strong incentive to supply more hours when only the spouse worked. Such an increase in hours may be influenced by fixed costs associated with establishing child care. The average spouse in this regime was younger and had a higher number of preschool children relative to other regimes, suggesting that financial pressure may have some bearing at that stage of the life cycle, but means for these variables were not statistically different. School-age children reduced spouse's supply by about 350 hours per child when both operator and spouse worked. When only the spouse worked, each school-age child increased supply by over 400 hours annually. Children also affected operator supply. School-age children had a negative impact on operator's supply. Preschool children significantly increased operator hours supplied when both operator and spouse worked, and decreased operator hours when the spouse did not work.
Farm characteristics had surprisingly little impact on supply decisions. Probit results showed that both operator and spouse reduced participation as farm sales increased. Given the decision to participate, size of farm had little impact on hours supplied when both worked off-farm. When only one worked off-farm, farm sales had a positive impact on hours supplied by both operator and spouse. Operator and spouse may be able to substitute hired labor for their own more effectively on larger farms. Farm type had little impact on participation decisions or supply functions. Only the binary variable for dairy farms was retained in final supply functions. Hours operator worked in regime 2 were significantly lower for dairy farms.
Other income had significant effects on operator's hours supplied when both worked, but did not significantly affect spouse supply functions in either regime. Commuting distance was used to capture location in the supply models.
Cogan has shown that commuting time costs may increase number of hours supplied. Mean parameter estimates for the spouse were consistent with that result; however, mean parameters were not significantly different from zero. Operator's commuting distance had little impact on supply.
When both worked off-farm, the operator did respond negatively to the spouse's commute.
Substantial variation was observed for individual parameters predicted from RCM supply functions. In several cases, both positive and negative values for individual parameter estimates were observed. For example, operator age Estimated wage and other income elast are presented in table 4. Operator ownelasticity varied from a low of -0.31 to of -0.01 in regime 1. However, when on operator worked, own-wage elasticity r from -0.78 to 0.04. Spouse own-wage was statistically significant when the op did not work off-farm. Estimated off-far ply own-wage elasticities for the spouse from -0.21 to a highly elastic -9.82. C wage elasticities for the spouse also varied an inelastic 0.07 to an elastic response of Generally other income effects were found statistically insignificant, with the excepti operator's off-farm labor supply wh erator and spouse worked off-farm individual income elasticities range to -4.17. Most income elasticities erator were negative, suggesting leis at the farm) is a normal good.
Conclusions
A joint model of farm families' off-farm participation and supply decisions was applied to a sample of Pennsylvania farm families. Evidence was found to support the behavioral assumption that farm operators and spouses make joint participation decisions. Operator participation decisions, for example, were dependent upon spouse's characteristics. Spouse participation decisions, however, were not dependent upon operator characteristics; family composition was more influential in spouse participation decisions. As expected, farm characteristics were important to operator participation decisions.
Off-farm supply function structures of operator and spouse were found to differ when the existence of corner solutions for both operator and spouse were explicitly acknowledged in the empirical specification. Multiple sample selection was important in estimating supply functions by random coefficient methods. When both operator and spouse work off-farm, hours sup- 
